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1. Introduction 
Although announcements of share repurchase programs on average generate positive 
short- and long-term excess returns (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995; Peyer and 
Vermaelen, 2009; Dittmar and Field, 2015), not all share buybacks are created equal. 
Buyback programs can have non-value-maximizing drivers such as earnings per share 
manipulation (Cheng, Harford and Zhang, 2015; Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong, 2004), 
preventing takeovers by increasing managerial ownership (Billet and Hui, 2007) or signaling 
a lack of investment opportunities. The challenge for outside investors is to judge whether a 
specific buyback announcement is driven by good motivations that will increase shareholder 
value.  
Research has suggested various predictive indicators to separate buybacks with good 
and bad drivers. First, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) develop an undervaluation index (U-
index) that assumes that managers of small, beat-up value stocks are more likely to 
repurchase shares because of undervaluation. The argument is that fewer analysts follow 
small firms, making market inefficiencies more probable. A buyback by a value stock is also 
much less likely to signal a decline in growth opportunities. Finally, a buyback preceded by a 
stock price decline is more likely to be driven by undervaluation than a buyback preceded by 
a stock price increase. Second, Caton et al. (2016) show that measures of governance quality 
are positively related to short- and long-term excess returns because higher governance 
quality should mean that managers care more about shareholder value. Finally, Evgeniou et 
al. (2018) show that long-term excess returns are positively related to volatility and 
particularly idiosyncratic volatility. The argument is that if an open-market buyback program 
creates an option to take advantage of undervaluation, the option is worth more if the stock is 
riskier (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). Moreover, the information advantage of managers 
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should be larger if stock prices are largely driven by company-specific information, which 
should correspond to higher idiosyncratic volatility. 
In this paper, we test the predictive power of another non-company-specific variable: 
community trust. In other words, we examine the extent to which shareholders can trust the 
statements of managers when a particular motivation is cited for share repurchase. Indeed, 
social trust is “a belief in the honesty, integrity and reliability of others – a faith in people.”1 
We assume that shareholders are aware of societal trust in the community, and we argue that 
when a firm’s headquarters are located in a county where individuals tend to trust each other, 
shareholders are more likely to trust management. To measure trust, we use the methodology 
of Hilary and Huang (2017), who base their measure of trust on the General Society Survey 
(GSS) prepared by NORC, the largest university-based survey research organization. The 
survey covers 333 counties, representing approximately one half of the total U.S. market 
capitalization and one half of the U.S. population. Hilary and Huang’s (2017) underlying 
assumption is that trust is a substitute for explicit contracts that align managerial and 
shareholder interests, such as incentive compensation and monitoring. In other words, when 
board members can trust managers, there are fewer agency problems, making it less 
necessary to control managers with explicit contracts; instead, managers make better 
investment decisions and firm value increases. The argument that trust can be a superior 
alternative to traditional methods for controlling agency problems is demonstrated 
theoretically by Chami and Fullenkamp (2002) and Al-Najjar and Casadesus-Masanell (2002) 
and empirically by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008, 2015). Vermaelen (2010) argues that 
business ethics should be defined as a respect for implicit contracts. If the implicit contract 
holds that managers should maximize shareholder value, a reasonable assumption in the U.S., 
then maximizing shareholder value becomes an ethical responsibility. However, such an 
                                                          
1 http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2007/02/22/americans-and-social-trust-who-where-and-why/ 
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implicit contract is more likely to be respected if managers can be trusted. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, Hilary and Huang (2017) show that in counties where trust is more prevalent, 
firms are less inclined to use explicit contracts to compensate and monitor executives. 
Moreover, despite the lack of explicit contracts, they find that firms suffer less from agency 
problems such as overinvestment and empire building and that trust in general is associated 
with higher firm value (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2015). 
In contrast to Hilary and Huang (2017), we do not assume that board members trust 
managers more when a company is located in a high-trust county. We also do not assume that 
county-level trust is a substitute for the use of explicit contracts. In other words, in this paper, 
trust is not a proxy for private trust between management and a board, but a proxy for public 
trust between shareholders and managers. These shareholders, unlike board members, do not 
have to personally know the CEO or live in the same county. However, they may believe that 
people who live there and have participated in the GSS are better able to judge the ethics of 
their fellow citizens. Trust is simply a publicly available indicator of whether one can believe 
that a manager is honest when stating his or her motivations for announcing a buyback. In 
other words, it is one more indicator, in addition to prior returns and the book-to-market ratio, 
that investors use to assess the consequences for shareholder value at the time of the buyback 
announcement. When shareholders respond to the buyback announcement in the short run, 
we hypothesize that they consider trust. In the long run, the truth is revealed, and we 
hypothesize that trust is positively related to long-term returns. Indeed, we assume that 
managers in high-trust counties are more likely to tell the truth when they motivate a buyback 
through undervaluation and commitment to shareholder value.  
We find that both short- and long-term announcement returns after open repurchase 
announcements are significantly larger when the repurchasing firm is located in a U.S. county 
where the level of trust is higher. We reach this conclusion after controlling for company-
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6 
 
specific variables such as the U-index and its components, governance quality and other 
sociodemographic variables that may be correlated with trust, such as religiosity, population 
size, ethnicity, income and income inequality (see Alesina and Ferrera, 2000, 2002). We 
admit that we do not know exactly why people in different counties trust each other more. If 
trust is driven by very personal reasons (e.g., traumatic experiences), then one would expect 
our trust measure to vary a lot over time and have no predictive value for short- or long-term 
stock returns. However, we document evidence that our trust measure is relatively stable. Of 
course, our lack of knowledge on what drives trust applies to other explanatory variables such 
as past returns. 
In all of our test specifications, the trust variable is one of the most robust predictors 
of long-term excess returns. We control for an array of county-year-level sociodemographic 
variables to further mitigate concerns that our results are confounded by omitted correlated 
sociodemographic variables. In robustness tests, we further include state fixed effects to 
control for the possibility that trust is driven by local economic conditions (economic growth, 
unemployment). Moreover, when managers state in a repurchase announcement press release 
that their shares are undervalued or that they want to demonstrate a commitment to 
shareholder value (i.e., reduce the agency costs of free cash flow), announcement returns are 
larger when trust is higher. In other words, as predicted, managerial statements of 
“undervaluation” and “commitment to shareholder value” are more credible in high-trust 
counties. 
The way that companies use share buybacks to time the market when a stock is 
undervalued applies similarly to equity issues: companies that believe their shares are 
overvalued have an incentive to issue overvalued stocks to benefit long-term shareholders. 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Spies and Affleck-Graves (1999) are the first to document 
evidence that equity issues are followed by negative long-term excess returns in the U.S. 
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Baker and Wurgler (2002) claim that market timing is the first-order determinant of capital 
structure. However, Evgeniou et al. (2018) show that this conclusion no longer holds when 
the 5-factor Fama-French (2015) model is used as a benchmark; although the buyback 
anomaly survives the 5-factor model, the equity issuance anomaly does not. 
Although timing through buybacks and equity issuance may seem similar, a closer 
look reveals two major differences. First, in contrast with an equity issuance, the seller is not 
aware that he or she is selling to the corporation after a buyback authorization announcement, 
at least when the repurchase program is executed in the open market. Moreover, while an 
equity issue is a firm commitment, the corporation may not execute the buyback program, as 
it is an option to repurchase stock and not a firm commitment (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 
1996). Second, when a firm repurchases shares, it is probably buying from an investor who 
had already decided to sell anyway. Issuing overvalued stock to a new investor is not a good 
start for a long-term relationship with a new equity investor. Therefore, market timing 
through issuing overvalued stock is not as straightforward as buying back undervalued 
stocks. Nevertheless, we expect investors to check for signals whether the equity issue is 
indeed an attempt to time the market and whether the response is contingent on trust. The 
hypothesis here is that managers that can be trusted are less likely to attempt to “cheat” 
investors by selling them overvalued stock. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence 
that short-term announcement returns are larger when managers can be trusted, after 
controlling for other company-specific variables. Although long-term excess returns are 
positively related to trust, the results are less robust, possibly due to the smaller sample size.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to clearly demonstrate that, when 
investors assess managerial incentives for repurchasing and issuing shares, markets look 
beyond company-specific characteristics. Our study complements a growing literature that 
examines the role of trust in corporate decisions. Prior studies have documented that trust 
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affects firm performance (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2015), financial reporting choices 
(Hasen, Hoi, Wu and Zhang, 2016), household investment decisions (Gurun, Stoffman and 
Yonker, 2018) and is more valuable during financial crisis (Lins, Servaes and Tamayo, 
2017). Using a survey from Great Place to Work® as a measure of employee trust, Edmans 
(2011) and Edmans (2012) shows a positive correlation between firm performance and 
employee perception of managerial ethics. We complement this stream of literature by 
showing that investors respond more favorably to buyback and equity issuance 
announcements when managers are perceived as more trustworthy by their neighbors. Our 
paper adds to the growing literature on the relevance of trust in finance. The implication is 
that promoting trust is an efficient way to solve agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and to create more credible signals in a world of asymmetric information.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
hypotheses. In Section 3, we test whether trust has an impact on short-term announcement 
returns around buybacks and equity issues. In Section 4, we test whether trust also influences 
long-term excess returns. In Section 5, we test whether stated buyback motivations in 
repurchase announcements can be trusted more when the firm’s headquarters are in high-trust 
counties. Section 6 describes several robustness checks. Section 7 provides concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. Data  
Our sample is constructed at the intersection of buyback announcement and seasoned 
equity issue announcement data from SDC, a buyback news search from Factiva to retrieve 
data on stated motivations for the buyback program, trust data from the GSS, financial 
information from Compustat/Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Thomson 
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Reuters, and sociodemographic variables from the U.S. Census and several government and 
non-profit datasets.  
2.1 Share buyback data 
We collect a sample of open-market share repurchase authorization announcements 
made by U.S. firms between 1992 and 2010. Announcements are obtained from the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions and Repurchases databases, and stock price and accounting data 
are obtained from CRSP and Compustat for U.S. firms. We focus on open-market share 
repurchases because they are the most common form of repurchase worldwide. We exclude 
1) going-private transactions by requiring that the percentage of shares sought for the 
buyback be less than 50%, 2) all events from firms in the financial and utility sectors, and 3) 
all events with missing trust information and control variables. Our final sample consists of 
5,479 buyback events from 1992 to 2010. 
We also collect data on the stated motivation for the buyback program by manually 
searching Factiva for relevant news articles. We classify announcements into five categories. 
The first category comprises announcements where the stated motivation may be interpreted 
as “undervaluation.” UnderValue is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if an 
announcement falls into this category. These are announcements that contain the following 
key words: “undervalue,” “future growth,” “gain in long run,” “confidence in future 
prospects” and “underperform.” The second category comprises announcements where the 
stated motivation may be interpreted as a reduction in agency costs of free cash flow. 
ReduceAgency is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if an announcement falls into 
this category. These are announcements that contain the following key words: “commitment 
to shareholder value,” “distribution of cash,” “good use of cash” and “increase shareholder 
value.” The third category comprises announcements that suggest earnings per share 
management. EPS Mgt is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if an announcement 
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falls into this category. These are announcements that contain the following key words: 
“strengthen EPS,” “avoid dilution,” “reduce number of shares” and “provide shares for use in 
executive compensation.” The fourth category comprises announcements that indicate the 
buyback is an expansion or an extension of a previous program. Bargeron, Bonaime and 
Thomas (2017) find that long-term excess returns are significant only after repeat 
repurchases. Extend Buyback is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if an 
announcement falls into this category. Finally, the fifth category comprises all of the 
announcements where no motivation is mentioned.  
 
2.2 Equity issue data  
We obtain equity issuance events from SDC. We remove the following events: 1) 
rights issues, 2) pure secondary offerings where existing shareholders sell shares without 
generating proceeds for the company, 3) issues made by non-U.S. firms or in non-U.S. 
markets, 4) issues made by closed-end funds or unit investment trusts, in addition to block 
trades, accelerated offers and best efforts, 5) events for which either the event date or the 
CUSIP is missing or where we find duplicate events with mismatching information, 6) the 
percentage of shares authorized is larger than 50%, 7) all events from firms in the financial 
and utility sectors, and 8) all events with missing trust information and control variables. Our 
final sample consists of 2,050 events from 1992 to 2010. 
 
2.3 Trust measures 
We measure public trust using the GSS prepared by NORC. NORC is the oldest and 
largest university-based survey research organization in the U.S. (Lavrakas, 2008). It 
incorporates methodological experiments into each year of GSS data collection. These 
experiments involve question wording, context effects, the use of various types of response 
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scales, random probes and other assessments of validity and reliability. NORC indicates that 
“the GSS is widely regarded as the single best source of data on societal trends.” In fact, it is 
the second most frequently analyzed source of information for the social sciences in the U.S. 
after the U.S. Census.2 The average response rate for the GSS is approximately 76%.3 Cook 
and Ludwig (2006, p. 381) indicate that the GSS “is capable of providing representative 
samples at the national or census region or even [the] division level.” The GSS covers 333 
counties, representing approximately one half of the total U.S. market capitalization and one 
half of the U.S. population. The details of the GSS survey’s methodology are relatively 
technical; more information can be found at the GSS website.4  
Essentially, the GSS asks whether people can be trusted, to which respondents answer 
“can be trusted” (assigned a value of 3), “can’t be trusted” (assigned a value of 1) or 
“depends or don’t know” (assigned a value of 2). We then take the average across 
respondents to obtain a county-level measure of trust for a given year. The average (and 
median) is around 1.8. We then transform this trust variable into a dummy variable: counties 
with an above-average level of trust are given a value of one, and counties with a below-
average level of trust are given a value of zero. This transformation makes interpreting 
regression coefficients more straightforward. As shown in the following, our results hold if 
we use continuous trust measures. Information on trust at the county level is available for 
every other year from 1992 until 2010, albeit not consecutively for every county. Other 
dimensions of trust (e.g., trust across racial lines, trust across socioeconomic status, trust in 
the federal government) are also measured, but much more haphazardly. In our main tests, we 
follow previous studies (e.g., Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000) and linearly interpolate the data to 
obtain values for the missing years. Approximating Trust linearly increases the power of our 
                                                          
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NORC_at_the_University_of_Chicago 
3 http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/.%5CDocuments%5CCodebook%5CA.pdf pp. 2112-2113. 
4 More technical information on the survey can be found here: http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website. 
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tests and gives us the opportunity to study the time-series properties of our setting, but as 
discussed in the following, the results also hold when we do not linearly interpolate Trust.  
Following the previous literature (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner, 2005; Loughran and Schultz, 2004; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006;), we define a 
firm’s location as the location of its headquarters. As noted by Pirinsky and Wang (2006), 
this approach appears “reasonable given that corporate headquarters are close to corporate 
core business activities.” We extract historical headquarters locations from previous 10-K 
filings available on Edgar. If the data are not available on Edgar, we use the value in the 
closest year for which data are available. Trust is our proxy for the market’s prior evaluations 
of CEO trustworthiness.  
We obtain most of the financial and accounting data from Compustat and the CRSP 
database. We remove firms from the utilities and financial sectors (with Standard Industrial 
Classification [SIC] codes between 40 and 49 and between 60 and 69) because they confront 
a very different regulatory and economic environment. 
 
2.4. Short- and long-term announcement returns 
For short-term announcement returns, we estimate cumulative abnormal (market-
adjusted) returns for 7-day (-3, +3) intervals around the announcement date. We use the 
value-weighted market index as the benchmark return. 
We calculate long-term announcement returns using the 4-factor Carhart model and 
Fama-French 5-factor model (Adj_ret5). We obtain estimates of the long-run risk-adjusted 
returns for individual firms in the spirit of Brennan et al. (1998) as follows. For a given stock 
in a given calendar month, the 1-factor risk-adjusted return is computed as the risk-free rate 
of return plus the residual from a regression of the stock’s excess return on the Fama-French 
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5-factor model. Risk-adjusted returns are then averaged over the 36-month period following 
the announcement date to obtain the risk-adjusted average monthly returns. 
 
2.5. Control variables 
Following prior studies, we control for firm size (Log Mtkcap), leverage ratio 
(Leverage), book-to-market ratio (BTM), institutional ownership (IO), capital expenditures 
(Capex), payout policy (Payout), return on assets (ROA), asset liquidity (Liquid Assets) and, 
following Evgeniou et al. (2018), estimates of volatility and idiosyncratic volatility.  
For buyback analyses, we consider whether the Undervaluation Index (U-index) 
developed by Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) remains a robust indicator of abnormal returns to 
separate companies that are buying back stocks because they are undervalued from 
companies that repurchase shares for other reasons. We calculate the U-index as follows. A 
given firm receives a prior return “score” of 5 if its return before the buyback announcement 
is in the lowest quintile of all of the CRSP firms’ prior 6-month returns in a given month. 
Firms in the highest prior return quintile receive a score of 1. Size and book-to-market scores 
are similarly assigned, with large firms receiving low scores (they are less likely to be 
mispriced) and high book-to-market firms receiving high scores (a value stock is more likely 
to buy back stock because it is undervalued than a growth stock). The U-index is the sum of 
the prior return, size and book-to-market scores and ranges from 3 (least undervalued) to 15 
(most undervalued). 
For equity issues, we construct an overvaluation index in a similar way, assuming that 
small firms with higher prior returns and high market-to-book ratios are more likely to be 
overvalued when they issue equity. Here, a firm receives a prior return “score” of 5 if its 
return before the buyback announcement is in the highest prior return quintile and a score of 
1 if it is in the lowest prior return quintile. The size and book-to-market scores are similarly 
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assigned, with large firms receiving low scores and high book-to-market firms receiving low 
scores. The O-index is the sum of the prior return, size and book-to-market scores and ranges 
from 3 (least overvalued) to 15 (most overvalued).  
Although we focus on the impact of public trust on buybacks and equity issue 
abnormal returns, concurrent changes to other social and economic conditions may drive 
changes to both trust and investor reaction. Specifically, we include the following county-
year characteristics: Population, Religiosity, gender distribution (%Female), Education, 
Income, Ethnicity, Income Inequality and political affiliation (%Vote Democrats). Consistent 
with prior studies such as Hilary and Huang (2017) and McGuire et al. (2012), we do not 
make predictions about the association between our demographic control variables and the 
various dependent variables we examine. We winsorize all of the continuous variables at the 
top and bottom one percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
2.6. Summary statistics 
Our sample is constructed as the intersection of these datasets, excluding financial 
service firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and consists of 5,479 
buyback announcements made by 2,134 firms and 2,050 equity announcements made by 
1,316 firms during the period 1992-2010. Table 1 Panel A provides summary statistics for the 
different independent variables in our buyback sample, while Panel B covers equity issues.  
Table 1 Panel A shows that the average value of the high trust dummy is 0.52, 
indicating that a typical repurchasing firm is headquartered in a relatively high-trust county. 
Untabulated results suggest that the level of trust is generally higher near the Canadian 
border. For example, out of 46 states for which we have data related to trust, Wisconsin ranks 
third and Minnesota ranks fourth. The level is intermediate on the coasts (California ranks 
28th and New York State ranks 23rd). It is lower in states near the Mexican border (e.g., New 
Mexico ranks 43rd) and in the South (e.g., Arkansas ranks 42nd and Mississippi ranks 45th). 
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Although trust is measured by polling different individuals in different years, our trust 
measure is relatively stable. Specifically, 85% (83%) of high (low) trust counties at t-1 
remain in the same category in year t. 
Comparing Panels A and B, on average, buyback announcements are preceded by 6-
month returns of 4.1%, while equity issues are preceded by large positive returns of 38%. 
Repurchasing firms tend to be profitable (average ROA of 7.3%), while equity issuers are 
unprofitable (average ROA is -12.4%) and, compared with repurchasers, they have lower 
payout ratios, higher leverage and lower book-to-market ratios. Thus, it seems equity issues 
have a solid economic driver: a movement to a capital structure that better fits the needs of a 
high-growth but unprofitable and highly levered firm. Nevertheless, equity announcements 
generate negative excess returns (-3.5%) on average, suggesting that investors are concerned 
about market timing, with firms issuing equity after a 38% stock price increase in the 
previous 6 months. 
The average (median) undervaluation index is 9.22 (9), slightly above the value one 
would expect if a typical repurchasing firm were not overvalued or undervalued (i.e., 8). 
However, the average value of the overvaluation index in the equity issue sample is 11.5, 
suggesting that the typical issuers appear overvalued, driven mainly by the large pre-
announcement returns. 
In terms of motivation for share buyback, about 50% of the announcements do not 
provide any motivation for pursuing the repurchase. Overall, 21.2% and 17.6% of 
announcements explicitly state reducing agency costs and undervaluation as the motivations 
for buyback transactions, respectively. Furthermore, 3.4% cite EPS management as the 
motivation, and 7.9% identify an extension to a previously announced buyback program. 
Tables 2 Panels A and B provide the univariate correlations between Trust and the 
different variables. In both panels, Trust is low in highly populated counties with more 
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females and high in counties populated with more educated, white and high-income 
inhabitants. Education is the variable most positively correlated with Trust. As expected, the 
U-index is highly negatively correlated with prior returns (-0.51) and market cap (-0.69) and 
positively correlated with the book-to-market ratio (0.56). The O-index is positively 
correlated with prior returns (0.56) and negatively with market cap (-0.52) and the book-to-
market ratio (-0.36). Trust is positively and significantly correlated with both short- and long-
term announcement returns in both the buyback and equity issue samples, providing initial 
evidence that trust and implicit contracting does affect investors’ perception of the 
transactions. 
 
3. Empirical evidence: Short-term announcement returns 
3.1 Share buybacks 
Consistent with previous research, the univariate statistics in Table 1 Panel A show 
that share buyback announcements generate significant positive excess returns of 2.2%. In 
Table 3 Panel A, we run multivariate regressions of short-term abnormal announcement 
returns against trust, the U-index or its components (the stock return during the previous 6 
months, the book-to-market ratio and firm size) in addition to buyback motivation dummy 
variables that take a value of one if management mentions undervaluation (UnderValue), the 
agency cost of equity reduction (ReduceAgency) or EPS management (EPS Mgt) or extension 
of buyback (Extend Buyback) as a motivation for the buyback. Columns (1) and (2) use the 
components of the U-index as control variables, and Columns (3) and (4) use the U-index 
directly as the control variable. In all of the columns, we control for company-specific 
variables such as leverage, institutional ownership, capital expenditures, payout policy, return 
on assets, asset liquidity and risk along with industry and year fixed effects. To mitigate the 
concern that the sociodemographic variables may drive a spurious correlation between Trust 
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and announcement returns, Column (3) and (4) further control for various sociodemographic 
variables at county-year level.  
The results show that regardless of the regression specifications in Table 3 Panel A, 
excess returns are always positively and significantly related to Trust, the U-index and the 
book-to-market ratio and negatively related to prior returns and market capitalization. When a 
company announces a repurchase in a county where trust is above average, the announcement 
returns are 1.4% higher. The U-index is the most statistically significant predictor of short-
term announcement returns. When the U-index increases by 1 point, the announcement 
returns increase by 0.4%. In addition, investors react more favorably when the motivation for 
buybacks is share undervaluation (UnderValue) or the reduction of agency costs and 
improvement in shareholder value (ReduceAgency). Relative to announcements where no 
explicit reasons are provided, stating undervaluation increases short-term announcement 
returns by 1.6%. Citing EPS management or the extension of previous buyback programs has 
no significant effect on announcement returns. 
The finding that excess returns are larger when the firm is less profitable is consistent 
with the agency costs of free cash flow hypothesis; that is, the market is relieved that cash is 
paid out rather than invested in projects that may not be beneficial to shareholders. That 
institutional ownership lowers excess returns is consistent with the hypothesis that 
institutions make markets more efficient (reducing any signaling effects) and reduce agency 
costs. The result that short-term announcement returns are positively correlated with volatility 
is consistent with the theory that a buyback program creates an option to take advantage of 
misevaluation (an effect first documented by Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). Alternatively, 
high-volatility stocks are more difficult to value, so managers and insiders are more likely to 
have an information advantage.  
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3.2 Equity issues 
Table 3 Panel B shows regressions of short-term excess returns against trust and other 
control variables. Consistent with previous research, univariate statistics in Table 1B indicate 
that equity issuers experience negative short-term returns of -3.5%. As in the case of 
buybacks, Trust increases short-term announcement returns for equity issuers; when trust is 
above average, announcement returns are 1.4% higher. Although the O-index has the 
expected sign, it is much less economically and statistically significant than the U-index in 
the repurchase sample. Focusing on the components of the O-index, as predicted, 
announcement returns are less negative when the firms are larger and prior returns are 
smaller. However, markets do not consider a high book-to-market ratio as a signal that the 
stock is less likely to be overvalued. The only other significant company-specific variable is 
volatility, but in contrast to the buyback sample, the effect on announcement returns is 
negative. One interpretation consistent with both samples is that highly volatile stocks are 
difficult to value, so it is more likely that stocks are either undervalued or overvalued. Hence, 
a buyback (equity issue) in a high volatile stock is more likely to be driven by undervaluation 
(overvaluation). 
The main conclusion from Table 3 is that investors consider trust as an important 
predictor of short-term announcement returns for both buybacks and equity issues. One 
interpretation is the governance–agency cost interpretation: both buybacks and equity issues 
can be driven by motivations not consistent with maximizing shareholder value. For example, 
in the case of buybacks, managers may buy back shares to increase bonuses tied to EPS 
targets. In the case of equity issues, firms may raise equity to obtain more excess cash and 
reduce the incentive effects of leverage (Jensen, 1986). An alternative interpretation is the 
signaling-market timing interpretation: firms want to buy back stocks when they are 
undervalued and issue shares when they are overvalued to benefit long-term current 
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shareholders. They are more likely to be concerned about these shareholders when trust is 
high.  
 
4. Empirical evidence: Long-term excess returns 
4.1 Share buybacks 
Table 1 Panel A shows that, on average, firms experience 0.8% excess returns per 
month after buyback authorization announcements. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that, at least on average, the market underreacts to buyback announcements and that 
managers are successful at market timing. Table 4 Panel A regresses monthly long-term 
excess returns against trust and other variables proposed in the literature, in addition to 
county-specific variables. Long-term excess returns are estimated using the Fama-French 5-
factor model.5  The first two columns use the components of the U-index (prior returns, 
market cap and book-to-market ratio) as control variables, and the last two columns use the 
U-index. Columns (2) and (4) control for other county-specific variables in addition to Trust.  
Consistent with the results for short-term excess returns, long-term excess returns are 
significantly positively correlated with Trust across all of the columns. When trust is 
relatively high, excess returns are 0.2% higher per month or 2.4% per year. Consistent with 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), we find that the U-index remains a highly significant and 
positive predictor of long-term abnormal returns across all regression specifications and that 
all of its individual components (prior return, size, and book-to-market) are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Turning to the stated motivations for the buyback, companies that 
mention undervaluation (EPS management) experience significant positive (negative) long-
term excess returns. This is expected, as the undervaluation motive implies that the current 
stock price trades significantly below its fundamental value. Managing EPS may boost the 
                                                          
5 We obtain similar results when we use the Carhart 4-factor model. For brevity, we do not tabulate this result. 
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short-term share price, but it is detrimental to the long-run growth prospect of a firm and 
hence attracts positive short-term announcement returns but negative long-run announcement 
returns. Although in the short run (Table 3 Panel A) the market responds positively to 
statements consistent with agency cost reductions, these statements appear to have no impact 
on long-term excess returns. One explanation is that the reduction in agency cost effect is 
fully priced at the time of the buyback authorization announcement. Unlike the market timing 
hypothesis, the agency cost hypothesis does not predict long-term excess returns. 
In contrast, although a follow-up buyback does not generate higher short-term excess 
returns, it is followed by significant long-term excess returns, suggesting that managers are 
better at market timing when they have more experience. Consistent with the findings of 
Evgeniou et al. (2018), measures of idiosyncratic and total risk are significantly positively 
related to long-term excess returns. Columns (3) and (4) further control for additional 
sociodemographic variables. Adding these control variables has no impact on the economic 
or statistical significance of the trust, U-index or other company-specific variables. Most of 
the sociodemographic characteristics are not significant. Out results are not consistent with a 
situation where firms in high trust counties manipulate stock prices because they know that 
buybacks will be well received. If this were the case, we should observe a reversal in the long 
run returns for firms in the high trust counties, which is the opposite of what we find. That 
would also be inconsistent with prior studies that document that high trust leads to higher 
financial reporting quality (e.g. Hasen, Hoi, Wu and Zhang, 2016; McGuire, Omer and Sharp, 
2012) 
Combining the results of Table 3 Panel A and Table 4 Panel A, we can conclude that 
the trust, the undervaluation index and its components, volatility and the undervaluation 
motivation dummy are significantly positively related to short- and long-term excess returns. 
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4.2 Equity issues 
Table 1 Panel B shows that monthly long-term excess returns are significantly 
positive (0.3% per month or 3.6% per year). It does not appear that, on average, equity 
issuers tend to issue stocks when they are overvalued. This result is consistent with Evgeniou 
et al. (2018), who also find (significant) positive long-run excess returns after equity issues 
when the 5-factor Fama-French model is used.6 Although, on average, firms do not issue 
shares when they are overvalued, some firms may be more likely to engage in market timing 
than others. 
Table 4 Panel B uses multivariate regression to examine the relation between trust and 
the long-term performance of equity issuers. As most of the equity issues do not state the 
reason for issuance, we drop all of the stated motivation dummies. In regression 
specifications (1) and (3), which exclude sociodemographic variables, trust is significantly (at 
the 5% level) positively related to long-term excess returns. The only component of the O-
index that is not significant in the short-term regressions, that is, the book-to-market ratio, is 
now statistically significantly positively related to long-term excess returns. Neither the O-
index nor its other components are statistically significantly related to long-term returns. That 
the (idiosyncratic) risk variables are also insignificant sheds further doubt on the hypothesis 
that equity issues are driven by market timing. In short, it is obvious that equity issues are not 
simply a reflection of buybacks, an assumption that is often made by asset pricing papers that 
combine both events in a net issue variable. As pointed out in the introduction, market timing 
by issuing overvalued stock is more problematic than buying undervalued stock. Short-term 
announcement returns after equity issues show clear concerns about market timing 
(considering the negative announcement returns and the significance of the trust variable, the 
O-index and volatility), but the long-run positive excess returns show that this concern is 
                                                          
6 We obtain similar results when we use the Carhart 4-factor model. For brevity, we do not tabulate this result. 
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unwarranted. Equity issues are typically interpreted as bad news by investors, but this 
interpretation is inconsistent with the long-term outperformance. Past research (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1997; Spies and Affleck-Graves, 1999) suggests that not using the Fama-French 5-
factor model and/or covering a different period produce the market timing results.  
 
4.3 Trust and long-term excess returns: A closer look 
The next step in our analysis is to form calendar time portfolios that sort long-term 
excess returns into four trust levels and test the extent to which trust alone can explain the 
cross-sectional variance of long-term excess returns. We also test the robustness of our 
findings by using the 4-factor Fama-French model, which adds momentum to the 3-factor 
Fama-French (1993) model. Finally, we test whether the relation between trust and long-term 
excess returns depends on the investment horizon.  
We conduct a long-term event study using the calendar time method. For each 
calendar month, we construct an equally weighted portfolio, including all of the firms that 
made a repurchase announcement in the previous 12 months (or 24, 36 or 48 months 
depending on the horizon). The composition of the portfolio thus changes each month. The 
average monthly abnormal return of the portfolio is then regressed against the 4 factors (when 
we use the 4-factor Fama-French model) or 5 factors (when we use the 5-factor Fama-French 
model). The intercept of the regression is thus the average monthly abnormal return in the 12 
(or 24, 36 or 48) months after the buyback announcement. The advantage of this method is 
that each event month gets the same weight, eliminating the biases created by clustering. For 
each horizon, we form four portfolios based on trust quartile. The results are shown in Table 
5 Panel A. The results confirm those from Table 4 Panel A. Regardless of the investment 
horizon or the factor model used for the benchmark, high-trust portfolios always outperform 
low-trust portfolios. For example, Figure 1 Panel A plots the average returns against trust 
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quartile over the 48-month investment horizon: the monthly excess return of 0.8% in the 
highest trust quartile is nearly twice as large as that in the lowest trust quartile. Note that the 
difference between excess returns in the first and last trust quartiles is always larger when we 
use the 5-factor model rather than the 4-factor model. Table 5 and Figure 1 Panel A both 
show that the relation between trust and excess returns is not monotonic: the difference 
between excess returns in quartiles 2 and 3 is not significant. 
Table 5 Panel B repeats the analysis of Table 5 Panel A using equity issue 
announcements. Similar to Table 5 Panel A, the difference between the two extreme trust 
quartiles is larger when we use the 5-factor model. Actually, using the 4-factor model, the 
excess returns in the highest trust quintile are lower than those in the lowest trust quintile 
over all investment horizons shorter than 48 months. Using the 5-factor model, the excess 
returns are higher in the top trust quartile than in the bottom trust quartile, except for the 36-
month investment horizon, but the differences are smaller than in the buyback sample. As in 
the buyback sample, the relation between Trust and excess returns is clearly not monotonic, 
and the most negative excess returns are found in the second or third trust quartile. The weak 
results of Table 5 Panel B confirm the results of Table 4 Panel B: the effect of trust on long-
term returns is weaker in the equity issue sample than in the buyback sample. This should not 
be surprising, as excess returns are never significantly different from zero over any horizon 
(in contrast to the buyback sample of Table 5 Panel A, where excess returns are significantly 
positive over every horizon). An investor should not be concerned that an equity issue is 
typically driven by market timing, that is, issuing overvalued stocks. 
Table 6 Panel A tests whether Trust and the U-index, our two most consistent 
predictors of long-term excess returns in the buyback sample, are correlated. It may well be 
that Trust and the U-index reinforce each other, suggesting investors who want to exploit the 
buyback anomaly should invest in high-U-index firms in high-trust counties. It also may be 
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that Trust and the U-index are substitutes: when trust is high, the buyback is driven by 
undervaluation, even when the U-index suggests otherwise. We compute monthly excess 
returns for nine (three by three) double-sorted portfolios for each investment horizon (12, 24, 
36 and 48 months) and for each of the 2-factor models. First, we form three portfolios based 
on the Trust tercile. Within each Trust level, we construct three portfolios based on the level 
of U-index. We calculate the portfolio returns based on equal weighted portfolios. As 
undervaluation is more probable in small caps, value weighting would bias the results against 
finding positive excess returns.  
Our results show that regardless of whether Trust is low or high, the U-index is a 
strong predictor of long-term excess returns. When Trust is low, on average, across all eight 
comparisons in Table 6 Panel A, the difference between monthly excess returns in the high 
and low U-index portfolios ranges from 0.42% (4-factor model, 36 months) to 0.47% (5-
factor model, 24 months) depending on the investment horizon and benchmark model used to 
calculate abnormal returns. When Trust is high, the difference between the monthly excess 
returns in the high and low U-index portfolios ranges from 0.05% (4-factor model, 12 
months) to 0.54% (5-factor model, 24 months). It is clear from Figure 1 Panel B that Trust 
and the U-index are not substitutes but rather complement each other. Indeed, in Table 6 
Panel A, across models and investment horizons, the highest excess returns are observed in 
the high-U-index, high-trust portfolios. At the same time, in six out of the eight comparisons, 
the lowest monthly excess returns are always observed in the low-trust, low-U-index 
portfolios. 
Table 6 Panel B shows a similar analysis for equity issues, replacing the U-index with 
the O-index. Is it the case that, when Trust is low and the O-index is high, excess returns are 
smaller? This would indicate that investors should avoid equity issues made by high-O-index 
firms in low-trust counties. The evidence in Table 6 Panel B contradicts this hypothesis: 
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when Trust is low, in six out of the eight cases, the low-O-index firms have higher excess 
returns than the high-O-index firms. However, when Trust is high, in all but one case (5-
factor model, 12 months), the equity issues announced by high-O-index firms are followed by 
lower excess returns than the equity issues announced by low-O-index firms. In other words, 
in counties where people trust each other, firms with a high O-index are able to issue 
overvalued stock. In counties where people do not trust each other, it is easier for firms that 
do not look overvalued (low-O-index firms) to issue overvalued stock. In such counties, 
investors are more suspicious that issuers will engage in market timing. 
 
5. Buyback motivations and trust 
When managers state in press releases that the company is undervalued or that it is 
committed to maximizing shareholder value, do markets attach more credibility to these 
statements when Trust is high? To answer this question, we re-run the cross-sectional 
regressions of Table 3 Panel A and Table 4 Panel A, multiplying the motivational variable by 
the Trust dummy. The results in Table 7 show that when Trust is high, the statement that the 
stock is undervalued is more credible and trusted by investors, which translates into higher 
short- and long-term excess returns, for all eight regression specifications. For example, a 
statement that the stock is undervalued increases short-term excess returns by 1.4% and long-
term excess returns by 0.3% per month when a firm is in a high-trust county. Statements that 
the buyback is motivated by agency cost reductions also increase short-term excess returns by 
1.4% in high-trust counties. The agency cost interaction dummy is not significant in the long 
run, which makes sense, as this motivation, unlike the undervaluation motive, does not 
assume market under-reaction. An interesting side question is whether companies in high-
trust counties are more likely to make such motivational statements. We indeed find that 
18.91% (16.36%) of announcements made by firms in high- (low-) trust counties state 
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undervaluation as a motivation, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
We observe no difference in frequency of stating agency reductions and EPS management as 
motivations for buyback announcements across high- and low-trust counties. 
 
6. Robustness tests 
The GSS does not measure the trust level in every period. In our baseline test, we 
linearly interpolate the estimates. As a robustness test, we focus on observations for which we 
have a direct measurement of trust. Although our sample size is smaller by approximately 
60%, our main results still hold, at least for the buyback sample. The results in Table 8 Panel 
A show that in the buyback sample, the trust variable is significantly (at the 1% level) related 
to short- and long-term excess returns in all of the model specifications. The economic 
impact of Trust on short- and long-term returns is now twice as large as in Table 3 Panel A 
and Table 4 Panel A. Hence, measuring Trust correctly improves its economic significance, a 
result that should not be surprising.  
Turning to equity issues, reducing the number of observations lowers the significance 
of the results reported in Table 3 Panel B and Table 4 Panel B. First, the Trust variable is now 
significant at the 10% level in three out of the four regression specifications for short-term 
announcement returns (and marginally insignificant in the other). Reducing the sample size 
obviously weakens our results, especially for the long-term excess returns. The lack of 
significance of Trust is not surprising, considering that this paper finds no evidence that 
equity issues are followed by statistically significant negative excess returns. There is little 
reason for investors to be concerned that equity issuers, on average, are trying to time the 
market by issuing overvalued stocks.  
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Second, we use the Trust dummy variable as our main measure for ease of 
interpreting interaction variables. We carry out robustness tests using the continuous Trust 
variable. The results in Table 9 show that our conclusions are not affected. 
Third, we control for an array of county-year level sociodemographic control in all of 
the regressions, and to further mitigate the concern that our results are confounded by omitted 
correlated sociodemographic variables, we further include state fixed effects. In other words, 
we carry out within-state, industry and year comparisons between firms located in high- and 
low-trust counties. The results in Table 10 show that our conclusions are not affected. 
  
7. Conclusion 
Firms that announce share repurchase programs and are located in high-trust counties 
experience statistically and economically significant higher short- and long-term excess 
returns than firms located in low-trust counties. When the firms issue equity, short- and long-
term returns are less negative in high-trust counties. Together with indicators of the 
likelihood of undervaluation (the U-index, volatility), Trust is the most consistent predictor of 
excess returns. When firms state in press releases that they are buying back stocks because of 
undervaluation, their statement is more credible in high-trust counties, as both short- and 
long-term excess returns are significantly larger. When they state that the buyback shows 
commitment to shareholder value (i.e., reducing agency costs), this statement is also a more 
reliable predictor of short-term returns. Trust and the likelihood of undervaluation (measured 
by the U-index) are not substitutes; after share buybacks, independent of the level of trust, 
high-U-index firms always experience larger excess returns than low-U-index firms.  
Firms that announce equity issues experience negative announcement returns. In 
addition, the announcement returns are larger when Trust is high and when indicators of 
overvaluation, summarized by an Overvaluation Index, are low. However, the effect of Trust 
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on long-term excess returns is economically and statistically less significant, which is 
consistent with some recent evidence that, when using the 5-factor Fama-French model, long-
term excess returns after equity issues are no longer significantly negative. Interestingly, 
when Trust is high, equity issuers are more likely to issue overvalued stock than when Trust 
is low, suggesting that low Trust levels generate more negative short-term announcement 
returns, making market timing more complicated. 
This paper is part of a growing body of literature showing that investors care about 
trust when assessing whether shareholder value maximization drives managerial decisions. In 
the context of buybacks, this is particularly relevant, as repurchases can be driven by bad and 
good motivations. This means that the agency costs of equity and information asymmetry can 
be reduced by not only designing explicit contracts or costly signaling mechanisms, but also 
promoting implicit contracts. In the U.S., managers have an implicit contract to maximize 
shareholder value. However, such an implicit contract is more likely to be enforceable or 
upheld in a high-trust environment. 
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Appendix 1 Variable Definitions  
Variables Definition 
Trust Trust constructed from the GSS. The survey asks whether people can be trusted, to which 
respondents answer “can be trusted” (assigned a value of 3), “can’t be trusted” (assigned a 
value of 1) or “depends or don’t know” (assigned a value of 2). We then take the average 
across all of the respondents from one county to obtain a county-level measure of trust for 
each year. When the trust measure is not available for a year, we interpolate the value from 
the most recently available value. Trust is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if 
the value is above median and zero otherwise. 
CAR[-3,3] Cumulative abnormal (market-adjusted) returns for 7-day (-3, +3) intervals around the 
announcement date. 
Adj_ret5 We obtain estimates of the long-run risk-adjusted returns for individual firms in the spirit of 
Brennan et al. (1998) as follows. For a given stock in a given calendar month, the one-
factor risk-adjusted return is computed as the risk-free rate of return plus the residual from 
a regression of the stock’s excess return on the 5-factor Fama-French model. Risk-adjusted 
returns are then averaged over the 36-month period following the announcement date to 
obtain the risk-adjusted average monthly returns. 
UnderValue An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions key words such as 
the following in the news article announcing the buyback: “undervalue,” “gain in long run,” 
“confidence in future,” “underperform,” “underperform in share price,” “low share price,” 
“share price is cheap,” “confidence in long term,” “growth in the long run” and “future 
growth prospects or opportunities.” 
ReduceAgency An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions key words such as 
the following in the news article announcing the buyback: “improve shareholder value,” 
“increase shareholder value,” “commitment to shareholder,” “return cash to shareholder” 
and “good use of cash.” 
EPS Management An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions key words such as 
the following in the news article announcing the buyback: “strengthen EPS,” “avoid 
dilution,” “reducing number of outstanding shares” and “use for executive compensation.” 
Extend Buyback An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company mentions key words such as 
the following in the news article announcing the buyback: “extension of buyback,” 
“expansion of buyback” and “authorized additional buyback.” 
NotState An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a company does not state the reasons for 
buyback.  
Prior Returns Stock return in the 6 months before buyback or equity issue announcements. 
Log Mktcap Log of equity market capitalization. 
BTM Book-to-market value of equity. 
U-index We calculate the U-index as follows. Companies receive a size score from 1 (large firms) to 
5 (small firms) depending on the quintile of their market value of equity in the month 
before the buyback announcement. We then calculate the 11-month absolute returns of 
months -12 to -1 before the announcement for all events and assign scores of 5 to the low-
return firms and 1 to the high-return firms. Finally, companies receive a book-to-market 
value (BE/ME) score depending on the quintile of their BE/ME of equity in the year before 
the buyback announcement, with small BE/ME firms receiving a score of 1 and large 
BE/ME firms receiving a score of 5. Like Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), we use CRSP 
companies to define the quintile thresholds each month. The U-index is the sum of the size 
s, book-to-market and momentum scores. 
Leverage Short-term debt plus long-term debt, divided by total assets. 
IO Percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors. 
Capex Capital expenditure over total assets. 
Payout Common dividend, all scaled by total assets. 
ROA Income before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. 
Liquid Assets Current assets minus current liability, scaled by total assets. 
Idio Risk Idiosyncratic volatility measured by (1-R2), where R2 is the goodness of fit from the 
regression of daily returns over the previous 6 months on the Fama-French 5-factor model. 
Volatility Daily standard deviation of returns during the previous 6 months. 
Religiosity Percentage of religious adherents at the county level. When the measure is not available in 
a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
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Population Total population at the county level according to the U.S. Census. When the measure is not 
available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
% Female Percentage of females in the county-level population. When the measure is not available in 
a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
Education Percentage of population with at least a bachelor’s degree at the county level. When the 
measure is not available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available 
value. 
Income Income per capita at the county level. When the measure is not available in a year, we 
interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
Income Inequality Blau Index of income at the county level. 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 − ∑ 𝑝2𝑘𝑖=1 , where p is the 
percentage of people residing in the county that fall in the income category i. We have 15 
income categories: families with income of less than $10,000, with income between 
$10,000 and $14,999, with income between $15,000 and $19,999, with income between 
$20,000 and $24,999, with income between $25,000 and $29,999, with income between 
$30,000 and $34,999, with income between $35,000 and $39,999, with income between 
$40,000 and $49,999, with income between $45,000 and $49,999, with income between 
$50,000 and $74,999, with income between $75,000 and $99,999, with income between 
$100,000 and $124,999, with income between $125,000 and $149,999, with income 
between $150,000 and $199,999 and with income above $200,000. When the measure is 
not available in a year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
Ethnicity  Percentage of white population at the county level. When the measure is not available in a 
year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
% Vote 
Democrats 
Percentage of votes cast for democratic president. When the measure is not available in a 
year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value. 
O-index We calculate the O-index as follows. Companies receive a size score from 1 (large firms) to 
5 (small firms) depending on the quintile of their market value of equity in the month 
before the buyback announcement. We then calculate the 11-month absolute returns of 
months -12 to -1 before the announcement for all events and assign a score of 1 to the low-
return firms and 5 to the high-return firms. Finally, companies receive a BE/ME score 
depending on the quintile of their BE/ME of equity in the year before the buyback 
announcement, with small BE/ME firms receiving a score of 5 and large BE/ME firms 
receiving a score of 51. Like Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), we use CRSP companies to 
define the quintile thresholds each month. The O-index is the sum of the size, book-to-
market and momentum scores. 
Trust_C Trust constructed from the GSS. The survey asks whether people can be trusted, to which 
respondents answer “can be trusted” (assigned a value of 3), “can’t be trusted” (assigned a 
value of 1) or “depends or don’t know” (assigned a value of 2). We then take the average 
across all of the respondents from one county to obtain a county-level measure of trust for 
each year. When the trust measure is not available in a year, we interpolate the value from 
the most recently available value.  
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Figure 1 Calendar Time Portfolio Returns—Shares Repurchases 
 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. The benchmark model is the Carhart four-factor model. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All other variables 
are defined in the Appendix.  
Panel A Share Buyback 
  N Mean Median Std P25 P75 
CAR[-3,3] 5,479 0.022 0.016 0.106 -0.025 0.066 
Adj_ret5 5,479 0.008 0.006 0.019 -0.003 0.017 
Trust 5,479 0.523 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Trust_C 5,479 1.847 1.800 0.458 1.571 2.111 
UnderValue 5,479 0.176 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.000 
ReduceAgency 5,479 0.212 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.000 
EPS Mgt 5,479 0.034 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.000 
Extend Buyback 5,479 0.079 0.000 0.270 0.000 0.000 
U-index 5,479 9.218 9.000 3.093 7.000 12.000 
Prior Returns 5,479 0.041 0.021 0.299 -0.133 0.190 
Log Mktcap 5,479 6.884 6.888 2.072 5.375 8.297 
BTM 5,479 0.486 0.402 0.348 0.252 0.616 
Leverage 5,479 0.170 0.138 0.167 0.005 0.285 
IO 5,479 0.124 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.000 
Capex 5,479 0.055 0.039 0.053 0.021 0.071 
Payout 5,479 0.012 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.013 
ROA 5,479 0.073 0.070 0.118 0.033 0.120 
Liquid Assets 5,479 0.275 0.252 0.233 0.076 0.436 
Idio Risk 5,479 0.756 0.787 0.166 0.645 0.895 
Volatility 5,479 0.030 0.026 0.016 0.018 0.037 
Religiosity 5,479 0.512 0.485 0.201 0.386 0.608 
Log Population 5,479 1.750 1.145 1.908 0.718 1.732 
% Female 5,479 0.510 0.509 0.010 0.503 0.517 
Education 5,479 0.343 0.336 0.089 0.270 0.410 
Income 5,479 2.795 2.638 0.757 2.240 3.280 
Ethnicity 5,479 0.681 0.693 0.139 0.564 0.798 
% Vote Democrats 5,479 0.563 0.561 0.118 0.475 0.636 
Income Inequality 5,479 0.906 0.911 0.018 0.897 0.921 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics, Continued 
Panel B Equity Offering  
  N Mean Median Std P25 P75 
CAR[-3,3] 2,050 -0.035 -0.032 0.099 -0.095 0.026 
Adj_ret5 2,050 0.003 0.004 0.035 -0.009 0.018 
Trust 2,050 0.488 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Trust_C 2,050 1.828 1.750 0.470 1.524 2.091 
O-index 2,050 11.535 12.000 2.472 10.000 13.000 
Prior Returns 2,050 0.382 0.238 0.657 -0.005 0.600 
Log Mktcap 2,050 5.926 5.811 1.489 4.891 6.807 
BTM 2,050 0.410 0.320 0.345 0.180 0.543 
Leverage 2,050 0.230 0.204 0.205 0.025 0.384 
IO 2,050 0.083 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.000 
Capex 2,050 0.076 0.042 0.095 0.018 0.089 
Payout 2,050 0.007 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.003 
ROA 2,050 -0.124 0.020 0.371 -0.247 0.078 
Liquid Assets 2,050 0.301 0.254 0.284 0.050 0.517 
Idio Risk 2,050 0.793 0.835 0.154 0.702 0.913 
Volatility 2,050 0.039 0.035 0.019 0.026 0.046 
Religiosity 2,050 0.492 0.465 0.181 0.365 0.586 
Log Population 2,050 1.645 1.133 1.692 0.673 1.834 
% Female 2,050 0.510 0.509 0.010 0.502 0.517 
Education 2,050 0.341 0.336 0.090 0.269 0.406 
Income 2,050 2.760 2.610 0.770 2.194 3.224 
Ethnicity 2,050 0.684 0.684 0.137 0.578 0.803 
% Vote Democrats 2,050 0.550 0.545 0.123 0.456 0.634 
Income Inequality 2,050 0.907 0.912 0.018 0.887 0.922 
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Table 2 Correlation 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
Panel A Share Buyback 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 
[1] CAR[-3,3] 1.00 
                         [2] Adj_ret5 0.17 1.00 
                        [3] Trust 0.06 0.06 1.00 
                       [4] UnderValue 0.08 0.06 -0.03 1.00 
                      [5] ReduceAgency 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.12 1.00 
                     [6] EPS Mgt 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.04 1.00 
                    [7] Extend Buyback -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 1.00 
                   [8] U-index 0.16 0.15 -0.02 0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
                  [9] Prior Returns -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.51 1.00 
                 [10] Log Mktcap -0.13 -0.18 0.03 -0.11 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.69 0.09 1.00 
                [11] BTM 0.13 0.10 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.56 -0.06 -0.49 1.00 
               [12] Leverage -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.14 0.03 1.00 
              [13] IO -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.12 0.01 0.16 -0.06 -0.02 1.00 
             [14] Capex -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.14 0.00 1.00 
            [15] Payout -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.08 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
           [16] ROA -0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.25 0.07 0.18 -0.33 -0.12 0.06 0.06 0.06 1.00 
          [17] Liquid Assets 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.26 -0.07 -0.38 0.06 -0.52 -0.05 -0.24 -0.04 0.08 1.00 
         [18] Idio Risk 0.07 0.13 -0.03 0.10 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.34 -0.07 -0.52 0.21 0.00 -0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.13 1.00 
        [19] Volatility 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.29 -0.19 -0.48 0.19 -0.21 -0.14 0.06 -0.09 -0.19 0.36 0.19 1.00 
       [20] Religiosity -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
      [21] Log Population -0.02 -0.01 -0.23 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.30 1.00 
     [22] % Female 0.02 -0.05 -0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.17 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.07 -0.16 0.10 -0.16 1.00 
    [23] Education 0.02 -0.04 0.27 -0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.14 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.16 -0.02 0.19 -0.29 -0.06 1.00 
   [24] Income 0.00 -0.08 0.19 -0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.11 0.00 0.21 -0.09 -0.09 0.12 -0.20 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.27 -0.09 0.12 -0.23 0.03 0.87 1.00 
  [25] Ethnicity 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.02 -0.40 0.08 0.01 -0.05 1.00 
 [26] % Vote Democrats 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.03 -0.13 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 0.13 0.34 0.31 0.37 -0.53 1.00 
[27] Income Inequality 0.00 0.05 -0.21 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.01 -0.13 0.09 0.12 -0.11 0.20 0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.19 0.07 -0.05 0.33 0.12 -0.74 -0.81 -0.16 -0.11 
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Table 2 Correlation, Continued 
Panel B Equity Offering     
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]   
[1] CAR[-3,3] 1.00 
                      [2] Adj_ret5 0.09 1.00 
                     [3] Trust 0.07 0.05 1.00 
                    [4] O-index -0.10 0.01 0.08 1.00 
                   [5] Prior Returns -0.09 0.02 0.05 0.56 1.00 
                  [6] Log Mktcap 0.14 0.01 -0.03 -0.52 -0.21 1.00 
                 [7] BTM -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.36 -0.05 -0.07 1.00 
                [8] Leverage 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.27 -0.10 0.25 0.21 1.00 
               [9] IO 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08 0.20 -0.04 0.01 1.00 
              [10] Capex 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.07 1.00 
             [11] Payout 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 1.00 
            [12] ROA 0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.18 0.22 0.19 -0.03 0.17 -0.04 1.00 
           [13] Liquid Assets -0.09 0.06 0.09 0.37 0.12 -0.28 -0.33 -0.55 0.02 -0.36 -0.07 -0.40 1.00 
          [14] Idio Risk -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.34 0.16 -0.52 -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.15 1.00 
         [15] Volatility -0.17 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.18 -0.34 0.02 -0.21 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.30 0.27 0.01 1.00 
        [16] Religiosity 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.10 -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 
       [17] Log Population 0.05 0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.21 1.00 
      [18] % Female -0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.12 -0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.12 -0.02 -0.09 0.11 -0.24 1.00 
     [19] Education 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.20 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.18 0.20 -0.07 0.13 0.07 -0.28 0.05 1.00 
    [20] Income -0.05 -0.04 0.14 0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.17 0.02 -0.19 0.01 -0.24 0.18 -0.18 0.13 0.02 -0.23 0.13 0.84 1.00 
   [21] Ethnicity -0.03 -0.03 0.13 0.11 0.06 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.35 0.02 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
  [22] % Vote Democrats -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.03 -0.22 0.03 -0.16 0.15 -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.02 0.38 0.40 0.46 -0.51 1.00 
 [23] Income Inequality 0.07 0.01 -0.17 -0.12 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.21 -0.01 0.21 0.02 0.22 -0.25 0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.32 -0.03 -0.75 -0.85 -0.12 -0.27 1.00 
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Table 3 Short-term Excess Return 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
Panel A Share Buyback 
 
Panel B Equity Offering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] 
  
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] 
          
 
         
Trust 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 
 
Trust 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 
(4.75)*** (4.30)*** (4.89)*** (4.47)*** 
  
(2.95)*** (3.05)*** (3.01)*** (3.09)*** 
UnderValue 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 
 
Prior Returns -0.009 -0.009 
  
 
(4.39)*** (4.35)*** (4.27)*** (4.24)*** 
  
(-1.97)** (-1.98)** 
  ReduceAgency 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 
Log Mktcap 0.008 0.007 
  
 
(2.71)*** (2.76)*** (2.78)*** (2.84)*** 
  
(3.64)*** (3.41)*** 
  EPS Mgt 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 
BTM -0.006 -0.005 
  
 
(0.70) (0.81) (0.78) (0.89) 
  
(-0.65) (-0.52) 
  Extend Buyback 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 
O-index 
  
-0.002 -0.002 
 
(1.52) (1.51) (1.50) (1.49) 
    
(-1.96)* (-1.93)* 
Prior Returns -0.029 -0.029 
   
Leverage -0.020 -0.017 -0.018 -0.015 
 
(-5.22)*** (-5.21)*** 
    
(-1.43) (-1.23) (-1.28) (-1.07) 
Log Mktcap -0.002 -0.002 
   
IO -0.002 -0.000 0.004 0.005 
 
(-1.59) (-1.72)* 
    
(-0.25) (-0.04) (0.38) (0.53) 
BTM 0.025 0.025 
   
Capex 0.012 0.016 0.022 0.025 
 
(3.70)*** (3.64)*** 
    
(0.41) (0.53) (0.74) (0.83) 
U-index 
  
0.004 0.005 
 
Payout -0.061 -0.045 -0.039 -0.023 
   
(8.10)*** (8.10)*** 
  
(-0.50) (-0.37) (-0.32) (-0.19) 
Leverage -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 
ROA 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(-0.64) (-0.70) (-0.68) (-0.72) 
  
(0.37) (0.23) (0.34) (0.22) 
IO -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 
Liquid Assets -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 
 
(-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.08) (-1.08) 
  
(-1.00) (-1.05) (-0.88) (-0.96) 
Capex -0.011 -0.004 -0.020 -0.012 
 
Idio Risk 0.007 0.008 -0.022 -0.019 
 
(-0.32) (-0.10) (-0.55) (-0.33) 
  
(0.38) (0.40) (-1.16) (-1.02) 
Payout 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 
Volatility -0.349 -0.380 -0.587 -0.604 
 
(0.15) (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) 
  
(-1.60) (-1.75)* (-2.83)*** (-2.94)*** 
ROA -0.054 -0.052 -0.057 -0.055 
 
Religiosity 
 
0.026 
 
0.027 
 
(-2.43)** (-2.37)** (-2.52)** (-2.48)** 
   
(1.88)* 
 
(1.96)* 
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Table 3 Short-term Excess Return, Continued 
Liquid Assets -0.017 -0.015 -0.022 -0.020 
 
Population 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
 
(-1.56) (-1.37) (-2.17)** (-1.94)* 
   
(2.73)*** 
 
(2.87)*** 
Idio Risk 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 
% Female 
 
0.009 
 
0.001 
 
(0.96) (0.84) (0.84) (0.79) 
   
(0.03) 
 
(0.00) 
Volatility 0.600 0.614 0.652 0.673 
 
Education 
 
0.168 
 
0.176 
 
(2.91)*** (3.00)*** (3.33)*** (3.46)*** 
   
(3.12)*** 
 
(3.26)*** 
Religiosity 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.015 
 
Income 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.017 
  
(-1.89)* 
 
(-1.88)* 
   
(-1.79)* 
 
(-1.83)* 
Population
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
Ethnicity 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.015 
  
(-1.62) 
 
(-1.55) 
   
(-0.48) 
 
(-0.69) 
% Female 
 
0.533 
 
0.526 
 
% Vote Democrats 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
  
(2.68)*** 
 
(2.65)*** 
   
(0.12) 
 
(0.02) 
Education 
 
0.069 
 
0.063 
 
Income Inequality 
 
0.227 
 
0.184 
  
(1.31) 
 
(1.22) 
   
(0.76) 
 
(0.62) 
Income 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.006 
      
  
(-0.95) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
Observations 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 
Ethnicity 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.026 
 
R-squared 0.084 0.097 0.076 0.089 
  
(-1.66)* 
 
(-1.67)* 
 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% Vote Democrats 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.005 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
(-0.32) 
 
(-0.24) 
      Income Inequality 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.039 
      
  
(-0.09) 
 
(-0.25) 
                 Observations 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 
      R-squared 0.066 0.069 0.064 0.067 
      Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 Long-term Excess Return 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
Panel A Share Buyback 
 
Panel B Equity Offering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
 
  Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
  
          Trust 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
Trust 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 
(4.81)*** (4.17)*** (4.80)*** (4.22)*** 
  
(2.23)** (1.54) (2.17)** (1.48) 
UnderValue 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
Prior Returns 0.001 0.001 
  
 
(2.98)*** (3.01)*** (3.02)*** (3.04)*** 
  
(0.44) (0.43) 
  ReduceAgency 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Log Mktcap 0.001 0.001 
  
 
(0.28) (0.34) (0.42) (0.49) 
  
(1.09) (0.91) 
  EPS Mgt -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
BTM 0.007 0.008 
  
 
(-1.87)* (-1.79)* (-1.89)* (-1.82)* 
  
(2.51)** (2.73)*** 
  Extend Buyback 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
O-index 
  
-0.000 -0.000 
 
(1.74)* (1.68)* (1.77)* (1.69)* 
    
(-0.76) (-0.71) 
Prior Returns -0.003 -0.003 
   
Leverage -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(-2.53)** (-2.57)** 
    
(-0.48) (-0.22) (-0.49) (-0.26) 
Log Mktcap -0.001 -0.001 
   
IO 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(-3.24)*** (-3.35)*** 
    
(1.06) (0.98) (1.10) (0.99) 
BTM 0.003 0.003 
   
Capex -0.022 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 
 
(2.52)** (2.46)** 
    
(-2.27)** (-2.25)** (-2.47)** (-2.48)** 
U-index 
  
0.001 0.001 
 
Payout -0.067 -0.057 -0.073 -0.064 
   
(5.95)*** (5.96)*** 
  
(-1.84)* (-1.57) (-1.99)** (-1.75)* 
Leverage -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
ROA 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 
(-1.38) (-1.27) (-1.31) (-1.20) 
  
(1.41) (1.36) (1.66)* (1.65)* 
IO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Liquid Assets 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.59) (0.49) (0.61) (0.52) 
  
(0.79) (0.52) (0.63) (0.34) 
Capex 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 
Idio Risk 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 
(1.08) (0.95) (0.96) (0.83) 
  
(0.64) (0.41) (0.45) (0.30) 
Payout -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
 
Volatility 0.044 0.029 0.041 0.030 
 
(-1.97)** (-1.88)* (-1.98)** (-1.89)* 
  
(0.62) (0.42) (0.59) (0.44) 
ROA 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 
Religiosity 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
(1.22) (1.34) (1.08) (1.19) 
   
(-0.43) 
 
(-0.50) 
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Table 4 Long-term Excess Return, Continued 
Liquid Assets -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
Population 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
(-1.67)* (-1.86)* (-1.65)* (-1.81)* 
   
(-0.49) 
 
(-0.68) 
Idio Risk 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 
% Female 
 
-0.206 
 
-0.202 
 
(1.80)* (1.99)** (2.81)*** (3.05)*** 
   
(-2.16)** 
 
(-2.11)** 
Volatility 0.119 0.113 0.137 0.132 
 
Education 
 
0.052 
 
0.051 
 
(4.23)*** (3.98)*** (5.04)*** (4.83)*** 
   
(2.39)** 
 
(2.35)** 
Religiosity 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
Income 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.009 
  
(-2.09)** 
 
(-1.99)** 
   
(-2.65)*** 
 
(-2.55)** 
Population
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
Ethnicity 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.012 
  
(-1.30) 
 
(-1.18) 
   
(-1.50) 
 
(-1.44) 
% Female 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.040 
 
% Vote Democrats 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
  
(-1.21) 
 
(-1.18) 
   
(0.14) 
 
(0.19) 
Education 
 
0.007 
 
0.006 
 
Income Inequality 
 
-0.122 
 
-0.100 
  
(1.06) 
 
(0.98) 
   
(-1.20) 
 
(-0.99) 
Income 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
      
  
(-0.79) 
 
(-0.90) 
 
Observations 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 
Ethnicity 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
R-squared 0.079 0.090 0.076 0.086 
  
(-1.99)** 
 
(-1.85)* 
 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% Vote Democrats 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
(-0.51) 
 
(-0.45) 
      Income Inequality 
 
0.016 
 
0.014 
      
  
(0.62) 
 
(0.55) 
                 Observations 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 
      R-squared 0.113 0.115 0.112 0.114 
      Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5 Calendar Time Portfolio Returns 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All other variables 
are defined in the Appendix.  
Panel A Share Buyback  
  FF 4-Factor Model     FF 5-Factor 
  
Monthly AR p-value 
   
Monthly AR p-value 
12 Months Low Trust 0.565% 0.002 
 
12 Months Low Trust 0.233% 0.002 
 
2 0.642% 0.000 
  
2 0.491% 0.000 
 
3 0.677% 0.005 
  
3 0.443% 0.005 
 
High Trust 0.861% 0.000 
  
High Trust 0.646% 0.000 
         24 Months Low Trust 0.509% 0.000 
 
24 Months Low Trust 0.223% 0.000 
 
2 0.661% 0.000 
  
2 0.442% 0.000 
 
3 0.681% 0.002 
  
3 0.405% 0.002 
 
High Trust 0.927% 0.000 
  
High Trust 0.793% 0.000 
         36 Months Low Trust 0.461% 0.001 
 
36 Months Low Trust 0.166% 0.001 
 
2 0.620% 0.000 
  
2 0.376% 0.000 
 
3 0.590% 0.004 
  
3 0.331% 0.004 
 
High Trust 0.819% 0.000 
  
High Trust 0.683% 0.000 
         48 Months Low Trust 0.414% 0.002 
 
48 Months Low Trust 0.119% 0.002 
 
2 0.551% 0.000 
  
2 0.325% 0.000 
 
3 0.516% 0.008 
  
3 0.261% 0.008 
  High Trust 0.793% 0.000     High Trust 0.648% 0.000 
Panel B Equity Offering 
  FF 4-Factor Model     FF 5-Factor 
  
Monthly AR p-value 
   
Monthly AR p-value 
12 Months Low Trust 0.152% 0.640 
 
12 Months Low Trust 0.006% 0.640 
 
2 -0.348% 0.253 
  
2 -0.358% 0.253 
 
3 -0.222% 0.523 
  
3 -0.078% 0.523 
 
High Trust -0.011% 0.975 
  
High Trust 0.078% 0.975 
         24 Months Low Trust -0.005% 0.986 
 
24 Months Low Trust -0.095% 0.986 
 
2 -0.118% 0.768 
  
2 -0.175% 0.768 
 
3 -0.265% 0.374 
  
3 -0.199% 0.374 
 
High Trust -0.040% 0.902 
  
High Trust 0.047% 0.902 
         36 Months Low Trust 0.069% 0.796 
 
36 Months Low Trust 0.005% 0.796 
 
2 -0.293% 0.184 
  
2 -0.358% 0.184 
 
3 -0.619% 0.066 
  
3 -0.571% 0.066 
 
High Trust -0.184% 0.560 
  
High Trust -0.156% 0.560 
         48 Months Low Trust 0.109% 0.648 
 
48 Months Low Trust -0.110% 0.648 
 
2 -0.102% 0.632 
  
2 -0.176% 0.632 
 
3 -0.080% 0.749 
  
3 -0.085% 0.749 
  High Trust 0.271% 0.301     High Trust 0.340% 0.301 
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Table 6 Two-way Sorted Calendar Time Portfolio Returns 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
Panel A Share Buyback—Sorted by Trust and U-index 
FF 4-Factor Model 
Horizon=12 Months 
 
Horizon=24 Months 
 
Horizon=36 Months 
 
Horizon=48 Months 
 
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
  
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
  
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
  
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
Low Trust 0.29% 0.51% 1.00% 
 
Low Trust 0.33% 0.51% 0.92% 
 
Low Trust 0.31% 0.41% 0.89% 
 
Low Trust 0.32% 0.34% 0.84% 
p-value 0.076 0.034 0.000 
 
p-value 0.021 0.008 0.000 
 
p-value 0.015 0.020 0.000 
 
p-value 0.008 0.040 0.000 
                                 
2 0.42% 0.39% 1.48% 
 
2 0.46% 0.53% 0.99% 
 
2 0.37% 0.45% 0.86% 
 
2 0.31% 0.43% 0.66% 
p-value 0.077 0.282 0.000 
 
p-value 0.040 0.113 0.000 
 
p-value 0.069 0.141 0.000 
 
p-value 0.117 0.143 0.002 
                                 
High Trust 0.69% 0.61% 1.05% 
 
High Trust 0.79% 0.81% 1.15% 
 
High Trust 0.63% 0.64% 1.08% 
 
High Trust 0.69% 0.68% 0.99% 
p-value 0.005 0.062 0.007   p-value 0.000 0.003 0.001   p-value 0.001 0.003 0.001   p-value 0.000 0.001 0.001 
FF 5-Factor Model 
Horizon=12 Months 
 
Horizon=24 Months 
 
Horizon=36 Months 
 
Horizon=48 Months 
 
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
  
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
  
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
  
Low U-index 2 High U-index 
Low Trust 0.03% 0.25% 0.69% 
 
Low Trust 0.03% 0.26% 0.66% 
 
Low Trust 0.00% 0.13% 0.60% 
 
Low Trust 0.03% 0.09% 0.51% 
p-value 0.076 0.034 0.000 
 
p-value 0.021 0.008 0.000 
 
p-value 0.015 0.020 0.000 
 
p-value 0.008 0.040 0.000 
                                 
2 0.15% 0.14% 1.25% 
 
2 0.10% 0.17% 0.81% 
 
2 -0.01% 0.13% 0.69% 
 
2 -0.06% 0.14% 0.48% 
p-value 0.077 0.282 0.000 
 
p-value 0.040 0.113 0.000 
 
p-value 0.069 0.141 0.000 
 
p-value 0.117 0.143 0.002 
                                 
High Trust 0.30% 0.58% 1.05% 
 
High Trust 0.50% 0.75% 1.20% 
 
High Trust 0.36% 0.56% 1.13% 
 
High Trust 0.46% 0.60% 0.97% 
p-value 0.005 0.062 0.007   p-value 0.000 0.003 0.001   p-value 0.001 0.003 0.001   p-value 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277418 
46 
 
Table 6 Two-way Sorted Calendar Time Portfolio Returns, Continued 
Panel B Equity Offering—Sorted by Trust and O-index 
FF 4-Factor Model 
Horizon=12 Months 
 
Horizon=24 Months 
 
Horizon=36 Months 
 
Horizon=48 Months 
 
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
  
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
  
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
  
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
Low Trust -0.19% 0.23% -0.12% 
 
Low Trust -0.22% 0.26% -0.11% 
 
Low Trust -0.15% 0.21% -0.02% 
 
Low Trust -0.04% 0.32% -0.14% 
p-value 0.573 0.602 0.850 
 
p-value 0.483 0.588 0.786 
 
p-value 0.585 0.492 0.967 
 
p-value 0.869 0.256 0.633 
                                 
2 0.06% -0.34% -0.93% 
 
2 -0.05% -0.59% -0.36% 
 
2 -0.28% -0.27% -0.50% 
 
2 -0.01% -0.11% 0.07% 
p-value 0.859 0.407 0.072 
 
p-value 0.863 0.053 0.342 
 
p-value 0.344 0.338 0.135 
 
p-value 0.957 0.678 0.812 
                                 
High Trust 0.61% -0.35% 0.23% 
 
High Trust 0.39% -0.04% -0.43% 
 
High Trust 0.51% -0.52% -0.25% 
 
High Trust 0.78% 0.14% -0.08% 
p-value 0.118 0.492 0.679   p-value 0.290 0.930 0.352   p-value 0.124 0.226 0.498   p-value 0.009 0.676 0.811 
FF 5-Factor Model 
Horizon=12 Months 
 
Horizon=24 Months 
 
Horizon=36 Months 
 
Horizon=48 Months 
 
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
  
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
  
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
  
Low O-index 2 High O-index 
Low Trust -0.42% 0.17% 0.41% 
 
Low Trust -0.39% 0.29% 0.14% 
 
Low Trust -0.22% 0.10% 0.05% 
 
Low Trust -0.22% 0.18% -0.23% 
p-value 0.573 0.602 0.850 
 
p-value 0.483 0.588 0.786 
 
p-value 0.585 0.492 0.967 
 
p-value 0.869 0.256 0.633 
                                 
2 0.24% -0.43% -0.72% 
 
2 0.01% -0.73% -0.16% 
 
2 -0.26% -0.38% -0.42% 
 
2 -0.04% -0.19% 0.11% 
p-value 0.859 0.407 0.072 
 
p-value 0.863 0.053 0.342 
 
p-value 0.344 0.338 0.135 
 
p-value 0.957 0.678 0.812 
                                 
High Trust 0.47% -0.07% 0.83% 
 
High Trust 0.30% 0.02% -0.04% 
 
High Trust 0.51% -0.53% -0.08% 
 
High Trust 0.74% 0.16% 0.23% 
p-value 0.118 0.492 0.679   p-value 0.290 0.930 0.352   p-value 0.124 0.226 0.498   p-value 0.009 0.676 0.811 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277418 
47 
 
Table 7 Buyback Motivation and Trust 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
                  
Trust 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.002 
 
(2.23)** (2.32)** (3.39)*** (3.39)*** (2.01)** (2.11)** (3.03)*** (3.08)*** 
Trust*UnderValue 0.014 0.014 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.015 0.003 0.003 
 
(1.99)** (2.08)** (2.12)** (2.11)** (2.03)** (2.12)** (2.25)** (2.23)** 
Trust*ReduceAgency 0.014 0.015 -0.000 -0.000 0.014 0.015 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(2.26)** (2.29)** (-0.33) (-0.30) (2.27)** (2.30)** (-0.45) (-0.42) 
Trust*EPS Mgt 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.16) (0.13) (-0.64) (-0.74) (0.23) (0.19) (-0.65) (-0.74) 
Trust*Extend Buyback -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-0.67) (-0.74) (-1.30) (-1.37) (-0.74) (-0.80) (-1.42) (-1.48) 
UnderValue 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.83)* (1.69)* (0.69) (0.71) (1.75)* (1.62) (0.63) (0.66) 
ReduceAgency 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.33) (0.35) (0.40) (0.47) (0.36) (0.39) (0.52) (0.60) 
EPS Mgt 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.34) (0.43) (-0.90) (-0.84) (0.37) (0.45) (-0.83) (-0.79) 
Extend Buyback 0.009 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 
 
(1.42) (1.45) (2.04)** (2.11)** (1.46) (1.49) (2.07)** (2.13)** 
Prior Returns -0.029 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.003 
 
 
(-5.21)*** 
 
(-2.52)** 
 
(-5.20)*** 
 
(-2.56)** 
 Log Mktcap -0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
 
(-1.65)* 
 
(-3.29)*** 
 
(-1.79)* 
 
(-3.41)*** 
 BTM 0.025 
 
0.003 
 
0.025 
 
0.003 
 
 
(3.67)*** 
 
(2.51)** 
 
(3.61)*** 
 
(2.45)** 
 U-index 
 
0.004 
 
0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.001 
  
(8.12)*** 
 
(5.98)*** 
 
(8.14)*** 
 
(6.00)*** 
Leverage -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-0.61) (-0.63) (-1.36) (-1.29) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-1.26) (-1.18) 
IO -0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.000 
 
(-1.24) (-1.03) (0.62) (0.65) (-1.24) (-1.04) (0.53) (0.55) 
Capex -0.011 -0.019 0.008 0.007 -0.003 -0.011 0.007 0.006 
 
(-0.32) (-0.54) (1.07) (0.95) (-0.09) (-0.32) (0.94) (0.82) 
Payout 0.006 0.008 -0.010 -0.010 0.008 0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.20) (0.24) (-1.88)* (-1.88)* (0.25) (0.28) (-1.78)* (-1.78)* 
ROA -0.054 -0.057 0.004 0.003 -0.052 -0.055 0.004 0.004 
 
(-2.44)** (-2.52)** (1.22) (1.08) (-2.38)** (-2.48)** (1.34) (1.20) 
Liquid Assets -0.017 -0.023 -0.003 -0.003 -0.015 -0.020 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-1.58) (-2.18)** (-1.67)* (-1.65)* (-1.40) (-1.96)** (-1.87)* (-1.82)* 
Idio Risk 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.006 
 
(0.92) (0.82) (1.80)* (2.83)*** (0.81) (0.77) (2.00)** (3.08)*** 
Volatility 0.607 0.661 0.119 0.137 0.621 0.682 0.112 0.131 
 
(2.95)*** (3.37)*** (4.21)*** (5.02)*** (3.03)*** (3.50)*** (3.95)*** (4.81)*** 
Religiosity 
    
-0.015 -0.015 -0.003 -0.003 
     
(-1.89)* (-1.87)* (-2.12)** (-2.01)** 
Population 
    
-0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
     
(-1.65)* (-1.58) (-1.29) (-1.18) 
% Female 
    
0.536 0.530 -0.040 -0.039 
     
(2.70)*** (2.67)*** (-1.19) (-1.16) 
Education 
    
0.068 0.062 0.007 0.006 
     
(1.29) (1.20) (1.05) (0.97) 
Income 
    
-0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
     
(-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.73) (-0.84) 
Ethnicity 
    
-0.027 -0.027 -0.006 -0.005 
     
(-1.75)* (-1.76)* (-2.16)** (-2.01)** 
% Vote Democrats 
    
-0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
     
(-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.58) (-0.53) 
Income Inequality 
    
-0.021 -0.046 0.017 0.015 
     
(-0.13) (-0.29) (0.64) (0.57) 
         Observations 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 
R-squared 0.068 0.066 0.114 0.113 0.071 0.069 0.116 0.115 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 Robustness Tests—No Interpolation 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
Panel A Share Buyback 
  Short-term Announcement Returns Long-term Announcement Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
                  
Trust 0.032 0.029 0.032 0.030 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(6.48)*** (5.66)*** (6.45)*** (5.77)*** (5.06)*** (4.61)*** (5.19)*** (4.79)*** 
     
  
   Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182 2,182 
R-squared 0.109 0.116 0.105 0.111 0.113 0.118 0.112 0.117 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B Equity Offering 
  Short-term Announcement Returns Long-term Announcement Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
                  
Trust 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.60) (1.71)* (1.84)* (1.89)* (0.70) (0.45) (0.64) (0.40) 
     
  
   Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 
R-squared 0.139 0.160 0.123 0.144 0.148 0.179 0.141 0.170 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 9 Robustness Tests—Continuous Trust Measures 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
Panel A Share Buyback 
  Short-term Announcement Returns Long-term Announcement Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
                  
Trust_C 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(4.06)*** (3.70)*** (4.20)*** (3.83)*** (4.03)*** (3.58)*** (4.04)*** (3.65)*** 
     
  
   Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 
R-squared 0.065 0.069 0.063 0.066 0.112 0.115 0.111 0.114 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B Equity Offering 
  Short-term Announcement Returns Long-term Announcement Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
                  
Trust_C 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(2.72)*** (2.61)*** (2.82)*** (2.63)*** (1.71)* (1.07) (1.66)* (1.03) 
     
  
   Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 
R-squared 0.084 0.096 0.075 0.088 0.078 0.089 0.075 0.086 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10 Robustness Tests—State Fixed Effects 
The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2010. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients (two-sided) at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
Panel A Share Buyback 
  Short-term Announcement Returns Long-term Announcement Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
                  
Trust 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(4.78)*** (4.62)*** (4.94)*** (4.81)*** (4.66)*** (4.20)*** (4.69)*** (4.29)*** 
     
  
   Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 5,479 
R-squared 0.077 0.078 0.075 0.076 0.123 0.126 0.122 0.125 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B Equity Offering 
  Short-term Announcement Returns Long-term Announcement Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-3,3] Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 Adj_ret5 
                  
Trust 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(2.69)*** (2.79)*** (2.73)*** (2.78)*** (1.93)* (1.32) (1.84)* (1.24) 
     
  
   Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 
R-squared 0.099 0.110 0.091 0.102 0.097 0.105 0.092 0.100 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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